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Human Rights Responsibilities
Private Corporations

of

Jordan J. Paust*
ABSTRACT

This Article discusses the human rights responsibilitiesof
private corporations. Part I addresses how decisions and
activities of multinational corporations impact human rights.
PartII examines corporate liability under human rights laws by
examining trends in judicial decisions in the United States and
foreign states and human rights instruments. Part III explores
the types of human rights deprivations that multinational
corporations might cause. The Article concludes by predicting
that there will be increasing scrutiny of corporate deprivations
of human rights at the domestic, regional, and international
levels.
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I. DECISIONS AND ACTIVITIES OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS CAN
SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACT HUMAN RIGHTS

Many private economic institutions, such as large multinational
corporations, often wield significant power and affect numerous
human beings both directly and indirectly in various sectors of public
and private life. In fact, many multinational corporations wield more
effective power and wealth than many nation-states. In terms of
potential impact, decisions and activities of many large multinational
corporations are capable of doing more harm to persons and resources
in ways that thwart human rights than decisions and activities of
some nation-states. 1 Additionally, large economic institutions are
often capable of doing more harm in violation of international law
than private individuals because they often wield more power and
wealth than individuals, often engage in activities that transcend
state boundaries and effective control, and are often capable of
causing more extensive injuries to persons or harm to property, other
resources, and the environment,
both domestically
and
transnationally. It is appropriate, therefore, to address human rights
responsibilities of private corporations, including relevant trends in
judicial decisions, the reach of human rights instruments, and types
of potential violations.
II. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS CAN BE LIABLE UNDER HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW

A. Cases Recognize Private and CorporateResponsibilityfor Human
Rights Violations
1. Trends in Decisions in the United States
Does human rights law reach private multinational
corporations? Despite the lack of widespread early attention to
private corporate liability for human rights deprivations, preferences
of a few textwriters, and remarkable confusion, 2 human rights law

1.
See, e.g., MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL.,
ORDER 103-04 (1980).

HuMAN

RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC

2.
See, e.g., Developments in the Law-InternationalCriminal Law, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 2025, 2025-26, 2030-31 (2001) (alleging, without citation, "international law is
virtually silent with respect to corporate liability for violations of human rights.
International law has neither articulated the human rights obligations of corporations
nor provided mechanisms to enforce such obligations. Corporations thus remain
immune to liability, and victims remain without redress."); Glen Kelley, Note,
MultilateralInvestment Treaties: A Balanced Approach to MultinationalCorporations,
39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 483, 513-15 (2001). Others apparently cling to imagined
theoretic distinctions between public and private responsibility while paying little or no
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can reach private corporations. More generally, a private corporation
as such is simply a juridic person and has no immunity under U.S.
domestic or international law.
In each nation-state, private
3
corporations, like private individuals, are bound by domestic laws.
Similarly, private corporations and entities are bound by
international laws applicable to individuals. For example, in the
United States and elsewhere, companies and other non-state
associations and organizations have been found to have civil and
criminal responsibility for various violations of international law,
including human rights and related international proscriptions. 4 In

attention to actual trends in decision or to the international human rights instruments.
Confusion and error might rest on nothing more than anti- or non-Realist
jurisprudential preference.
3.
This widespread pattern of legal responsibility and nonimmunity of private
corporations under domestic law is itself a general principle of law relevant to
international legal decision making. Concerning the relevance of general principles of
law, see, e.g., I.C.J. Statute, art. 38(1)(c); Barcelona Traction Light and Power
Company, Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 34-35, 38 (Feb. 5) (corporate entities are
recognized institutions in domestic legal processes and "have an important and
extensive role in the international field"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(1)(c), reporter's note 7 (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT]; INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 101-02 (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1994).

4.
See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 6-23, 30-34; Weisshaus v. Swiss Bankers
Ass'n (In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation), 225 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2000) (involving

the participation of Swiss banks in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide); Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 336-37"(11th Cir. 1992) (finding the
Contras could be civilly liable for torture and unlawful killing); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C.
Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding the PLO and various
organizations could be civilly liable for murder); In re Nazi Era Cases Against German
Defendants Litig., 198 F.R.D. 429 (D.N.J. 2000); In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig.,
105 F. Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); In re Austrian & German Bank Holocaust Litig.,
80 F. Supp. 2d 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Doe I v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 8
(D.D.C. 1998); Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 739 F. Supp. 854, 858, 860 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); JORDAN J. PAUST, JOAN M. FITZPATRICK, JON M. VAN DYKE, INTERNATIONAL
LAw AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 16, 106-07 (2000) (discussing Japanese court that
found Japanese store liable for discrimination against foreigners in violation of the
International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec.
21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195) [hereinafter LAW AND LITIGATION]; JORDAN J. PAUST, M.
CHERIF BASSIOUNI ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 43-44, 617 (2d ed. 2000)
[hereinafter CRIMINAL LAW]; RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 213, reporters' note 7
(claiming "Multinational enterprises have been under increasing scrutiny by
international bodies"); 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ENFORCEMENT 21, 104, 230

(M.C. Bassiouni ed., 1987); Jordan J. Paust, The Other Side of Right: Private Duties
Under Human Rights Law, 5 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 51, 59 (1992) (addressing the duty to
criminally proscribe certain "organizations" in the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, article 4) [hereinafter Private

Duties]; Beth Stephens, Human Rights Accountability: Congress, Federalism and
InternationalLaw, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 277, 284-85 (2000) ("[Corporations can
be held liable for human rights abuses when they are responsible for violations of
international human rights norms that apply to private actors; or when they act in
complicity with government officials to commit other human rights violations.")
[hereinafter Stephens, Accountability]. See also In re World War II Era Japanese
Forced Labor Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (American nationals' claims
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the United States, private companies have rights to sue under the
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) 5 and it is only logical and policyserving that they can also be defendants under the ATCA. In fact,
there have been express recognitions to that effect in U.S. cases. 6 For

against Japanese corporations concerning slave labor of former prisoners of war in
violation of the 1907 Hague Convention No. IV, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, and thus
claims concerning war crimes, had been settled by a 1951 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Peace),
addressed in Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 132, 139-43 (2001); MODOUGAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 103-04 (discussing
"deprivations and nonfulfillment" of human rights values by corporations); 2
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 n.3 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952)
("observance of fundamental human rights is not dependent upon the recognition of a
specific status."); Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Aug. 8,
1945, arts. 9-10, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (concerning criminal groups and organizations);
Control Council Law No. 10, Dec. 20, 1945, art. II(1)(d) (concerning criminal groups
and organizations), reprinted in PAUST, BASSIOUNI ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 151, 152 (2000).
5.
28 U.S.C. § 1350. See, e.g., Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine
Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 488 U.S. 428 (1989); 1
Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795) (commenting that "there can be no doubt that the company
...injured by these acts ... [has] a remedy by a civil suit... " under the ATCA); see
also La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 458, 461 (1899) (holding
that even though claims before a U.S.-Mexican Commission were those of governments,
a private company had a claim of right under a "treaty and the award of the
commission," and such right is undoubtedly "susceptible of judicial determination" in
the United States); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 592 (1839) ("We think it is
well settled, that by the law of comity among nations, a corporation created by one
sovereignty is permitted to make contracts in another, and to sue in its Courts...").
6.
See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (involving human rights claims about imprisonment,
torture, and killing); Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000);
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1090-95 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Doe v.
Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Nat'l Coalition Gov't of Union
of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 348 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (noting that a private
company utilizing slave labor may be subject to liability under the ATCA); 26 Op. Att'y
Gen. 250, 251-53 (1907); see also Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998);
Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975) (suggesting
private adoption agencies were joint tortfeasors under the ATCA, but there was no
briefing on such and they were not joined in the complaint); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor
Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999); Ge v. Peng, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10834, at
*6-7, dismissed, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 12711 (Aug. 28, 2000); Doe v. The Gap, Inc., No.
CV99-717 (D. Haw.) (settled-see CALIFORNIA LAWYER 17 (Jan. 2000)); Kathryn L.
Boyd, Collective Rights Adjudication in U.S. Courts: Enforcing Human Rights at the
Corporate Level, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1139 (1999); Richard L. Herz, Litigating
Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 545 (2000);
Kevin M. McDonald, Corporate Civil Liability Under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act for
Violations of Customary International Law During the Third Reich, 1997 ST. LOUISWARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 167 (1997); Hari M. Osofsky, Environmental Human
Rights Under the Alien Tort Statute: Redress for Indigenous Victims of Multinational
Corporations,20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 335, 347 n.37, 391-95 (1997); Kenneth
C. Randall, Further Inquiries Into the Alien Tort Statute and a Recommendation, 18
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 473, 501-03 (1986); Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign
Affairs: Congress's Power to "Define and Punish . . . Offenses Against the Law of
Nations," 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 521-22 (2000); Stephens, Accountability, supra
note 4, at 284-85. But see Bigio v. The Coca-Cola Co., 235 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2000).
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example, in 1997, in Doe v. Unocal Corp.,7 the Central District of
California recognized that several human rights and other
international law claims made by farmers from Burma against a
private corporation and others were viable under the ATCA. 8 These
claims included claims of slave or "forced" labor, torture, violence
against women, and other human rights violations and crimes
against humanity that also occurred in complicity with Burmese
military, intelligence groups, and police. 9 Addressing universal

There the court stated that no cause of action under the ATCA existed when no
allegation existed in the complaint that private companies were "involved in the taking
of the Bigios' property or complicit in the government's alleged violation of
international law" and the "sole allegation against Coca-Cola is that it acquired or
leased the property that previously had been expropriated on the basis of the owners'
religion" and, at most, Coca-Cola had only an "indirect economic benefit from unlawful
state action," did not violate international law, and did not act "together with state
officials or with significant state aid" in violation of international law, which would
have provided "color of law" responsibility in addition to any private responsibility of
the companies. Id. at 70-72. In dictum, the opinion also stated that racial or religious
discrimination and "discriminatory expropriation of property" are listed in the
Restatement as violations "when undertaken by a state action." Id. at 71. This is true
with respect to expropriation, but some forms of private discrimination are addressed
by international treaties.
Plaintiffs in Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 2000 WL 1225789 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28,
2000), affd in part and vacated in part, 273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2001), raised several
human rights claims against Union Carbide under the ATCA, but the district court did
not rule on the ATCA claims because plaintiffs lacked standing-which was found to be
exclusive in the Government of India-and plaintiffs' claims were barred by a 1989
settlement agreement. In Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 4th 165, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d
854 (2000), a California Court of Appeal upheld dismissal of a suit under a state law
concerning deception of consumers-allegedly because of health, safety, and wage
deprivations by Nike in Vietnam and Indonesia and failure to disclose such to
consumers-because of the primacy of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
over state law.
There are a number of other ATCA cases and opinions addressing private actor
duties under international law. See Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No.
1607); Jama v. I.N.S., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362-63 (D.N.J. 1998); Doe I v. Islamic
Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.D.C. 1998); Mushikiwabo v. Barayagwiza, 1996
WL 164496 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 864 (D. Md. 1961); 26 Op.
Att'y Gen. 250, 252-53 (1907); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795); see also Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989) ("The Alien Tort
Statute by its terms does not distinguish among classes of defendants, and it of course
has the same effect after the passage of the FSIA as before with respect to defendants
other than foreign states."); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 206 (D.C. Cir.
1985) ("The Alien Tort Statute . . . may conceivably have been meant to cover only
private, nongovernmental acts.
); M'Grath v. Candalero, 16 F. Cas. 128 (D.S.C.
1794) (No. 8810).
7.
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
8.
Id. at 889-90.
9.
Id. at 891-92. Later, the district court dismissed such claims, finding "no
evidence that Unocal 'participated in or influenced' the military's unlawful conduct,"
that Unocal conspired with the military, or that Unocal's conduct amounted to
"participation or cooperation in the forced labor practices" beyond mere knowledge of
and benefits from the unlawful military practices. 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1306-07, 1310
(C.D. Cal. 2000). But see Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995), cert.
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denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996) (finding "color of law" responsibility exists when a private
actor acts "together with" or "in concert with" a state or "with significant state aid");
Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 445-46 n.27 (finding liability when defendant was "in close
cooperation with" or had "work[ed] closely with" a state). Apparently the district court
did not realize that various human rights prohibitions other than those relating to
slavery or forced labor, genocide, other crimes against humanity, or war crimes can
form the basis for private actor liability in the absence of conspiratorial state
involvement, complicity with a state actor, or "color of law," and that U.S. tests for
"color of law" or "state action" responsibility are not part of international law and are
inappropriate and too limiting with respect to non-state actor liability for various other
human rights violations. The court in Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1304-05,
1307-08, was apparently unaware of judicial recognitions and opinions of Attorneys
General not cited therein, the Executive's Amicus brief in Filartiga(quoted infra note
36), and other recognitions of private actor liability noted herein. The district court
also seemed to be unaware of the full range of complicity standards under international
law. Concerning standards regarding criminal complicity that can include both action
and inaction amounting to participation, assistance, aiding, encouragement,
reinforcement, or inducement--each with some minimally demonstrated criminal
intent-see, e.g., CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 4, at 39-43. However, civil liability should
pertain under a lower threshold than criminal intent, e.g., negligence or fault. See, e.g.,
LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 4, at 510-12 (addressing the Soering Case, 161 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. A),
80-92 (1989) (conduct by one actor when such involves a
foreseeable "real risk" of a human rights violation by another actor leads to an
independent violation, an "associated" violation, or a form of complicitous violation of
human rights)), 517 (addressing a similar decision in Chahal v. United Kingdom, Eur.
Ct. H.R. (15 Nov. 1996)), 557, 561 (Jefferson's recognition), 565-66 (also addressing a
1994 Human Rights Committee decision), 626 (addressing Cicippio v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998) and complicity of Iran in hostage-taking). Civil
liability for fault is normal in international law. Id. at 406-07, 410, 869, 871;
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 601.

Clearly, if the military had acted as a de facto agent of Unocal, liability also could
have been based on negligence under the customary "knew or should have known"
standard. See, e.g., LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 4, at 17, 21, 288-90, 293, 302, 30507, 310-11, 329, 332-34, 342 (also addressing application of the standard where persons
who commit violations are under one's effective authority or control). Concerning such
a standard under international criminal law, see, e.g., PAUST BASSOUNI ET AL., supra

note 4, at 29-30, 46-76, 99, passim.
In Doe v. Unocal Corp., plaintiffs had argued that Unocal knew that the Burmese
military violated human rights in furtherance and for the benefit of a joint venture
with Unocal. Unocal, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1295-96, 1306. The court should have
considered whether Unocal was liable alternatively (1) as a private actor during a joint
venture with another actor who, with the knowledge of Unocal, committed violations in
furtherance and to the benefit of the joint venture-perhaps implicating vicarious
liability; (2) whether Unocal thus acquiesced in and is responsible for such violations;
(3) whether, in context, its knowledge and failure to object or its acquiescence
amounted to some form of encouragement, reinforcement, influence, or participation;
and (4) whether Unocal is otherwise liable under the circumstances instead of shifting
to a more limiting test of responsibility developed merely for independent "color of law"
or "state action" responsibility or looking merely at criminal complicity under
international law. Id. at 1309-10. Cf. Andrew Ridenour, Doe v. Unocal Corp., Apples
and Oranges: Why Courts Should Use International Standards to Determine Liability
for Violation of the Law of Nations Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 9 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 581, 602-03 (2001). Additionally, the panel in Kadic v. Karadzic did not state
that all or any human rights violations other than torture or extra-judicial killing
required state actors or "color of law," which would have been incorrect. Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that no state action requirement
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jurisdiction through the ATCA and nonimmunity of corporate actors
for cruel, inhumane treatment and slave or forced labor, the district
court in Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co.' 0 added: "No logical reason exists
for allowing private individuals and corporations to escape liability
for universally condemned violations of international law merely
because they were not acting under color of law."" In 1907, an
Opinion of the U.S. Attorney General recognized that a private U.S.
company violated a treaty by diverting the Rio Grande through
The Attorney General noted that an
dredging activities. 12
International Water Boundary Commission "found ... [t]hat the ...
Company ...violated the stipulations of that treaty," and recognized
that injuries included "damage to property," including injury to
"riparian rights," and "[a]s to indemnity for injuries which may have
been caused to citizens of Mexico, I am of the opinion that existing
statutes provide a right of action and a forum . . . the statutes
13
[including the ATCA] thus provide a forum and a right of action."
In Burger-Fischerv. DeGussaAG. & DeGussa Corp., claims were
made concerning the seizure of property and slave labor. 14 In Bodner
v. Banque Paribas, the court found that claims against banks for
looting, conversion, and withholding of assets of victims of the Nazi
Holocaust in violation of human rights and other international law
were actionable under the ATCA. 15 Alleged corporate involvement
with prison labor also led to suits in Ge v. Peng'6 and Doe v. The Gap,
Inc.'7 Ge was later dismissed, however, because, "[u]nlike Kadic and
its progeny, . . . [the] case involves the use of forced prison labor in

applies to actions under the ATCA, "the state action concept, where applicablefor some
violations like 'official' torture .. ") (emphasis added). Indeed, the phrase "color of
law" is not one used in international law or in the ATCA, and courts should not amend
federal statutes by adding words that Congress has not chosen. That phrase appears
only in the Torture Victim Protection Act and Congress chose not to amend the ATCA
to limit claims to those involving state action or in any other way. Id. at 241, 245.
10.
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999). With respect
to nonimmunity, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a),
1602-05, recognizes immunity merely for foreign states and foreign state entities. Id.
§ 1603(b). It clearly does not apply to individuals--official or private-or to private
juridic entities. See also Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 438. Moreover, even when the
FSIA reaches foreign state entities, the violation of treaties exception to immunity
contained in §§ 1330(a) and 1604 assures that violations of human rights treaties are
not entitled to immunity, especially since human rights law requires access to courts
and application of the right to an effective remedy. See infra notes 13, 62.
Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 445.
11.
12.
26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 251-54 (1907).
13.
Id. at 251-53.
14.
Burger-Fischer v. DeGussa Ag. & DeGussa Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 27273 (D.N.J. 1999).
Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). See also
15.
supra note 4.
16.
Ge v. Peng, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10834, at *6-7, dismissed, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12711 (Aug. 28, 2000).
Doe v. Gap, Inc., No. CV99-77 (D. Haw. 1999).
17.
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the production of soccer balls .. .[and] forced prison labor [according
to the court] is not ... proscribed by international law."1 8 In Jama v.
U.S. LN.S, 19 the court found that violations of human rights
prohibitions of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment by a private
correctional corporation and its officers and employees acting under
contract with the Immigration and Naturalization Services-which
made the corporate officers "state actors" 2 0-were actionable under
the ATCA. 21 In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, the district court
found that claims of arbitrary detention involving a Brazilian
company and an individual owner thereof who allegedly conspired
22
with local Brazilian officials were actionable under the ATCA.
In addition to cases involving claims under the ATCA, lawsuits
brought against companies under other U.S. statutes or domestic
legal provisions have led to recognition of the applicability of relevant
human rights precepts in varied contexts. 23 Additionally, a growing
number of lawsuits have been brought against companies or
corporations under state "human rights" laws that appear to be
relevant not merely because of titles of the various state laws and
state entities created to enforce such laws, 2 4 but also because claims
discrimination. 25 Employment
involve employment
typically

18.
Ge v. Peng, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12711, at 18 (Aug. 28, 2000).
19.
Jama v. I.N.S., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362-63 (D.N.J. 1998).
20.
Id. at 365-66.
21.
Id. at 362-63.
22.
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078, 1090-95 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
23.
See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155
(1989) (recognizing a "fundamental human right, that of privacy"); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483, 487 (1974) (same); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1248, 1254, 1261 (3d Cir. 1978) (discussing "human right"
of equal opportunity for female employees and the 1964 Civil Rights Act); In re Nazi
Era Cases, 198 F.R.D. 429 (D.N.J. 2000) (claiming the voluntary dismissal of human
right and other claims occurred because of agreement pertaining to redress through an
available fund); Cont'l Data Sys., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23490, at
9 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co.); Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing
Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 758 (D. Conn. 1935); Behrens v. Ill. Cent. Ry. Co., 192 F. 581, 582
(E.D. La. 1911) (finding that the act of Congress reaching a private company provides
"betterment of human rights"); infra notes 92-95. See also Trotter v. Jack Anderson
Enter., Inc., 818 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1987) (discussing indirect attention to alleged CocaCola plant involvement in human rights violations in Guatemala); Jacobs v. Martin
Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 1977) (recognizing "basic civil rights of man" in
the employment arena); U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F.
1006, 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (not recognizing "the right of mankind" to contract out of all
courts); Jones v. Great S. Fireproof Hotel Co., 86 F. 370, 375-76 (6th Cir. 1898) (stating
liberty of contract is one of the "inalienable rights of man" and a "right of man");
Kyriazi v. W. Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 894, 942 (D.N.J. 1978) (involving sex-based
discrimination claims in the employment arena).
24.
Express use of "human rights" in the state laws presumably demonstrates
an intent of state legislatures to implement relevant human rights through such state
laws. They typically relate to freedom from discrimination.
See Newman v. Fed. Express Corp., 266 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2001) (involving
25.
a claim of race discrimination under the Tennessee Human Rights Act); Farias v.
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discrimination claims could constitute claims under international
human rights law, but such claims are expressly based on state
human rights laws and decisions of state human rights commissions
26
or boards.
2. Trends in Decisions Outside the United States
Judicial decisions outside the United States have recognized
human rights responsibilities of private persons, companies, and
corporations. As noted elsewhere in this essay, Japanese 27 and
German 28 cases have recognized such forms of private responsibility,
and there has been similar recognition by the European Court of
Human Rights. 29
More recently, the British House of Lords
recognized that a private corporation's responsibilities under
domestic employment law are "[s]ubject to observance of fundamental

human rights.

.

.

.,,

In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada

recognized that it is possible "for a non-state actor to perpetuate

Instructional Sys. Inc., 259 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001) (alleging claims of national origin
and race discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law); Thiessen v.
G.E. Capital Corp., 255 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 2001) (regarding claim of age
discrimination filed with the Kansas Human Rights Commission); Harris v. Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp., 252 F.3d 595 (2d Cir. 2001) (involving claims of race, sex, and
age discrimination filed with the New York State Division of Human Rights); Cifra v.

G.E. Co., 252 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2001) (concerning a claim of gender discrimination
made before the New York State Division of Human Rights); Heinemeier v. Chemetco,
Inc., 246 F.3d 1078 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing claims of sexual harassment and age
discrimination filed with the Illinois Department of Human Rights); Medina v. Ramsey
Steel Co., 238 F.ad 674 (5th Cir. 2001) (making a claim of age discrimination asserted
before the Texas Commission on Human Rights); Conetta v. Nat'l Hair Care Ctrs., Inc.,
236 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2001) (alleging claims of sexual harassment and age
discrimination filed with the Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights); Black v.
Target Stores, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22746 (8th Cir. 2001) (concerning claim of race
discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act); Solomon v. Giorgio Armani
Corp., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 21469 (2d Cir. 2001) (regarding claims of sexual
harassment and discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law and
New York City Human Rights Law); Interdonato v. Bae Sys., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
12105 (2d Cir. 2001) (involving claim of age discrimination under the New York
Human Rights Law); Romano v. U-Haul Int'l, 233 F.3d 655 (1st Cir. 2000) (involving
claim of sex discrimination under the Maine Human Rights Act); Levin v. Yeshiva
Univ., 754 N.E.2d 1099 (Ct. App. N.Y. 2001) (regarding sexual orientation
discrimination in the area of married couples and housing priority); Era Aviation, Inc.
v. Lindfors, 17 P.3d 40, 43-45 (Alaska 2000) (involving "her human rights complaint"
under the Alaska Human Rights Act).
26.
See supra note 25.
27.
See supra note 4 and infra note 36.
28.
See infra note 36.
29.
See infra note 50.
30.
Johnson v. Unisys, Ltd., UKHL/13, 37 (22 March 2001) (Lord Hoffmann).
See also Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Assoc., Ltd., 1999 WL 852150 (House of Lords
1999) (rent and housing legislative use of word "family" interpreted with reference to
human right precepts in case involving succession to a tenancy with private charity
landlord).
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human rights violations on a scale amounting to persecution" within
the reach of the Refugee Convention 3 ' and, more generally, that
private actors can engage in human rights violations.8 2 Previously,
the Supreme Court of Canada recognized that sexual harassment in
the workplace can involve a corporate violation of human rights
precepts concerning sex-based discrimination actionable under
Canadian human rights legislation. 33 An Israeli Supreme Court
Justice recognized that "basic human rights are not directed only
against the authority of the state, they spread also to the mutual
34
relations between individuals themselves."
B. Human Rights Instruments Often Reach PrivatePerpetrators
Most human rights instruments speak generally of particular
rights of each person or everyone without any mention of or
limitation concerning which persons or entities owe a corresponding
duty. Thus, most duties are generally not limited to state actors and
do reach private persons or entities.3 5 Moreover, violations of human
rights recognized in particular treaties and customary international
36
law often reach private perpetrators expressly or by implication.

31.
Pushpanathan v. Canada, [1998] 160 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 231, 1998 D.L.R.
Lexis 512 (Can. 1998), also noting a related practice of Australia. The Court
recognized that private violations of human rights fell within the scope of Article 1 F (c)
of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, which deals
with denial of refugee protections to persons "guilty of acts contrary to the purposes
and principles of the United Nations." Id. United Nations Charter purposes and
principles include the need to respect and observe human rights. See infra note 37.
32.
Id.
33.
Janzen v. Platy Enterprises Ltd. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252, 1989 S.C.R. Lexis
265 (Can. 1989). Sex-based discrimination is a violation of human rights law. See U.N.
CHARTER, arts. 1(3), 55(c); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
19, 1966, arts. 2(1), 26, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
34.
C.A. 294/93, Hevra Kadisha, Jerusalem Burial Co. v. Kestenbaum, 46(2)
P.D. 464, 550.
35.
See Private Duties, supra note 4, at 52-53; LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN
INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 215 (1989) ("Most [human
rights) are documented in terms of the right of persons and not in terms of
They are, in the words of the
participation in or protection from the state.
International Court of Justice, obligatio erga omnes (owing by and to all humankind).").
36.
See Private Duties, supra note 4, at 51 n.5, cited in Kadic v. Karadzic, 70
F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995); THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
62, 179-80, 235-36 (2d ed. 1995); CHEN, supra note 35, at 78, 205, 215-16; ANDREW
CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 91-104 (1993); McDOUGAL ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 96-107 ("both a depriver and a deprivee of human rights" (96),
multinational corporations' "deprivations and nonfulfillment" of human rights values
(103-04)), 585, 587, 807-10; E. McDOWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1975 168, 171 (1976) (Executive recognition that acts of a private
perpetrator constituted an "offense against the human rights of passengers and crew");
LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 4, at 14-15, 106-07 (discussing 1999 Japanese district
court award for private store discrimination against customer in violation of the
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination), 153, 318;
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For example, the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights recognizes that the human rights proclaimed therein are "a
common standard of achievement for all peoples ... [including] every
individual and every organ of society."3 7 Article 29, paragraph 1,
affirms that "Everyone has duties to the community ..... ,;38 Article 30

Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, at 21,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (human rights laws 'directly create rights and duties of
private individuals . . . ' do create such . .. duties," quoting the "highly respected"
Constitutional Court of Germany); G.A. Res. 144, U.N. GAOR, Declaration on the Right
and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and
Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/53/144, Annex ("Recognizing the right and the responsibility of individuals,
groups and associations to promote respect for . . .human rights"), art. 10 ("No one
shall participate, by act or by failure to act where required, in violating human
rights .. "),art. 18 (1) ("Everyone has duties towards and within the community .... )
and (2) ('Individuals, groups, institutions and non-governmental organizations have
... a responsibility in . . . promoting human rights .... ) (1999), available at
www.un.org/documents/ga/res/53/a53r144.pdf; Amnesty International, Human Rights
Principles for Companies, ACT 70/01/98 (1998) ("Multinational companies have a
responsibility .... Companies and financial institutions are organs of society [within
the meaning of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights].... All companies have a
direct responsibility to respect human rights in their own operations.") [hereinafter A.I.
H.R. Report]; see also U.N. Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan, A Compact for the New
Century (Jan. 31, 1999), available at www.un.org/partnerslbusiness/davos.htm (calling
on corporate leaders to "a) support and respect the protection of international human
rights within their sphere of influence; and b) make sure their own corporations are not
complicit in human rights abuses"-thus, affirming expectations of the link between
human rights responsibilities and corporations); Draft Code of Conduct on
Transnational Corporations, art. 14, U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (12 June 1990)
("Transnational corporations shall respect human rights and fundamental freedoms in
the countries in which they operate .... ); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d
424, 443-45 (D.N.J. 1999); ALISON D. RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 41-44
(1990); infra notes 37-62. Concerning early recognition of duties of humanity, relevant
also to crimes against humanity, see, e.g., Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1107
(C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) ("Under all the obligations due to the universal society of
the human race, the citizens of the states still continue. . . . On states as well as
individuals the duties of humanity are strictly incumbent .... ).
37.
G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). The
Universal Declaration is now an authoritative human rights instrument identifying
and evidencing the content of human rights protected through the UN Charter as well
as many rights under customary international law. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980) (human rights "guaranteed to all by the [United
Nations] Charter" are "evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights" and "Charter precepts embodied in this Universal Declaration 'constitute basic
principles of international law."'), also quoting G.A. Res. 2625, Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 25 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505
F. Supp. 787, 796-97 (D. Kan. 1980) (use of Universal Declaration as authoritative
indicia of rights); McDOUGAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 272-74, 302, 325-30; JORDAN J.
PAUST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 181, 191, 198-200, 228
n.182, 245 n.372, 256 n.468, 286 n.595, 436 n.48 (1996) [hereinafter INT'L LAW AS LAW];
Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declarationof Human Rights in National
and InternationalLaw, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287 (1995/96).
38.
Universal Declaration, supra note 37, art. 29(1).
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recognizes that no right of "any . . .group or person . .. [exists] to

engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction
of any of the rights and freedoms set forth" in the Universal
Thus, there are correlative duties of groups and
Declaration. 9
to
engage
in acts aimed at the destruction of human
persons not
Indeed, Article 30-like
rights set forth in the Declaration. 40
an
rights
instruments-contains
major
human
provisions in most
interpretive command that "[n]othing ...be interpreted as implying
for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and
freedoms set forth herein."'4 1 Because numerous human rights are set
forth in the Declaration without any mention of "state" actors or any
limitation to state actor duties or "color," the express and unavoidable
interpretive command in Article 30 prohibits adding words or
implying limitations that the drafters did not choose. Article 30 also
should not be read so as to interpret particular human rights articles
as if groups or persons can engage in any activity or perform any act
aimed at the destruction of such rights, but state actors or those
acting under "color"-and only such actors-cannot do so. 4 2 The

39.
Id. art. 30.
40.
See, McDoUGAL ET AL., supra note 1, at 807-10 (also addressing similar
provisions and implied private duties in most of the major human rights instruments);
RENTELN, supra note 36, at 41-44; Private Duties, supra note 4, at 54; see also infra
note 50.
See supra note 39.
41.
In the United States, another rule of construction requires that treaties be
42.
interpreted in a broad manner in favor of rights that may be claimed under them, and
thus to protect express and implied rights in a manner not limiting of the reach of
private rights or corresponding duties. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 29394 (1933); Nielsen v.-Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 51 (1929); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123,
127 (1928); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924) ("Treaties are to be
construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and, when two constructions are possible, one
restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the
latter is to be preferred."); United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 448 (1924)
("Construing the treaty liberally in favor of the rights claimed under it, as we are
bound to do ....");Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 271 (1890) ("where a treaty admits
of two constructions, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed under it and the
other favorable to them, the latter is to be preferred."); Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100
U.S. 483, 487 (1879) ("Where a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive as to
the rights, that may be claimed under it, and the other liberal, the latter is to be
preferred.") (citing Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 249 (1830) ('If the treaty
admits of two interpretations, and one is limited, and the other liberal; one which will
further, and the other exclude private rights; why should not the most liberal
exposition be adopted?")); Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344, 348-49
(1809) (Marshall, C.J.) ("Whenever a right grows out of, or is protected by, a treaty, it is
sanctioned against all the laws and judicial decisions of the states; and whoever have
this right, it is to be protected."). Also, private duties pertain even though there is no
express mention of individuals or individual duties in a treaty. See, e.g., Henfield's
Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1120 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) (Wilson, J., on circuit);
Private Duties, supra note 4, at 52 n.7.
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4
correlative reach of Article 30 is to "any" group or person. 3
The preamble to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)44 expressly affirms "that the individual,
having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he
belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and
observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant."4 5 Thus,
at a minimum, individuals have duties to not violate human rights.
Article 5, like Article 30 of the Universal Declaration, also affirms the
lack of a right of "any . . . group or person . . . to engage in any
activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the
rights and freedoms set forth" in the Covenant "or at their limitation
to a greater extent than is provided," 46 and thus impliedly affirms the
duty of any group or person to not destroy or limit human rights.
Private duties are also expressly recognized in the preamble to
and Articles 27 through 29 of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights. 47 Article 17 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fuhdamental Freedoms contains a
"group or person" provision similar to those in the Universal
Declaration and the International Covenant. 48 It affirms the lack of a
right of "any . . . group or person ... to engage in any activity or
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights or
freedoms set forth . . . [in the European Convention] or at their
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the
Convention.' 49 Thus, an implied correlative duty of any group or
person exists to not destroy or limit such rights. Indeed, the
authoritative European Court of Human Rights has expressly
recognized that private "terrorist activities . . . of individuals or
groups . . . are in clear disregard of human rights,"50 therefore

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 37, art. 30.
43.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
44.
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
Id. pmbl. (emphasis added).
45.
Id. art. 5, 1 1.
46.
See also supra note 36
O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (1981).
47.
(commenting on private duties in major human rights instruments).
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
48.
Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, art. 17 (1950).
Id.
49.
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 149 (1977). For
50.
similar recognitions by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, see, e.g., U.N. Comm.
H.R., Res. 2000/30 (2000), in The Report of the Commission on Human Rights on its
Fifty-sixth Session, U.N. ESCOR 2000, Supp. No. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.412000/167; U.N.
Comm. H.R., Res. 1999/27 (1999); U.N. Comm. H.R., Res. 1998/47 (1998), U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1998/177; U.N. Comm. H.R., Res. 1997/42 (1997). See also U.N. Comm. H.R.,
Res. 1998/73 (1998) (hostage-taking is aimed at the destruction of human rights);
MCDOWELL, supra note 36. The link between private acts of terrorism and private
violations of human rights has additional recognition. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 46/51, pmbl.,
1 9 (1991), U.N. Doc. A/46/654 (1991), reprinted in PAUST, BASSIOUNI ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 293 (2000); U.N. G.A. Res.
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affirming that duties of private individuals and groups exist under
human rights law.
The preamble to the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man 5 ' acknowledges that "the fulfillment of duty by each
individual is a prerequisite to the rights of all. Rights and duties
are interrelated .... ";52 Articles XXIX through XXXVIII set forth
several express duties of private actors. 53 Indeed, the very title of
the American Declaration is an express affirmation of private
human rights duties. 54 The American Convention on Human
Rights 55 also contains express recognition that "[e]very person has

3034, 27 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. AIRES/3034 (1971); International Convention Against
the Taking of Hostages, pmbl., 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 (1979); O.A.U. Grand Bay
12, CONF/HRA/DECL(I) (1999)
(Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action,
(condemnation of terrorism as a violation of human rights); 1973 Siracuse, Italy
Conference on Terrorism and Political- Crimes, Final Document: Conclusions and
Recommendations, pt. I 1-2, printed in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND POLITICAL
CRIMES xi (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed. 1975); Michael J. Bazyler, Capturing Terrorists in
the 'Wild Blue Yonder: InternationalLaw and the Achille Lauro and Libyan Aircraft
Incidents, 8 WHITTIER L. REV. 685, 688 (1986); Robert A. Friedlander, Terrorism and
InternationalLaw: What Is Being Done?, 8 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 383, 387-88 (1977); Jordan
J. Paust, The Link Between Human Rights and Terrorism and Its Implications for the
Law of State Responsibility, 11 HAST. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 41 (1987). See also
5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/579 (1985) (taking of hostages and
U.N.S.C. Res. 579, pmbl.,
abductions have severe consequences for the rights of victims and are manifestations of
1-2
terrorism), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 243 (1986); U.N. G.A. Res. 40/61, pmbl.,
(1985), U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/61 (1986) (terrorism violates human dignity and loss of
innocent lives, and mindful of relevant human rights instruments, all acts of terrorism,
"by whomever committed," are unequivocally condemned), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 239
(1986).
51.
O.A.S. Res. XX (1948), O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L/V/I.4 Rev. (1965). The
United States, and all states in the Americas, are bound by the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man, which is now a legally authoritative indicia of human
rights protected through Article 3 (k) of the O.A.S. Charter, Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S.
3, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2631, amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847. See also Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, I-A, Inter45 (1989); Inter-American
Am. C. H.R., Ser. A: Judgments and Opinions, No. 10,
Comm. on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of the Inhabitants of the Interior of
Ecuador Affected by Development Activities, Chapter VII (1996), O.A.S. Doc.
OEAISer./V/II.96, doc. 10, rev. 1 (Apr. 24, 1997) ("The American Declaration . . .
);
continues to serve as a source of international obligation for all member states ....
BUERGENTHAL, supra note 36, at 175, 180-81; RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST HANNUM,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 802-03 (3d ed. 1995); FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID
WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 261-62, 269 (1990); MCDOUGAL ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 198, 316; INT'L LAW AS LAW, supra note 37, at 287 n.595; Private
Duties, supra note 4, at 54 n.17. See also American Convention on Human Rights, No.
36, 1969, pmbl., art. 29(d), (American Declaration is an authoritative human rights
instrument and is not limited by the Convention).
52.
O.A.S. Res. XX (1948), pmbl., O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEAISer. L./I.4 Rev. (1965).
53.
Id.
54.
This express affirmation of private duties was made at the same time that
the Universal Declaration was created. Id.
55.
American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22,
1969, 144 U.N.T.S. 123 (1970) [hereinafter American Convention]. Although the
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responsibilities to . . . his community, and mankind," 56 and Article
29(a) commands that the treaty not be interpreted to allow "any
. group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the
rights and freedoms recognized ... or to restrict them to a greater
extent than is provided for" in the Convention. 57 Thus, an implied
duty of groups and persons exists to not suppress or restrict
human rights. The American Convention also contains express
58
references to responsibilities of private companies.
The authoritative Human Rights Committee created under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 59 has also
recognized that states should report "the provisions of their criminal
law which penalize torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment .... whether committed by public officials or
other persons acting on behalf of the State, or by private persons.
Those who violate article 7, whether by encouraging, ordering,
tolerating or perpetuating prohibited acts, must be held
responsible. '' 60 The Human Rights Committee added that states have
a duty to afford protection against such acts "whether inflicted by
people acting in their official capacity, outside their official capacity or
in a private capacity"6 1 and "States must not deprive individuals of
62
the right to an effective remedy.

United States signed but has not ratified the American Convention on Human Rights,
the United States is obligated to take no action inconsistent with the major purposes of
the Convention. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art.
18(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; INT'L LAW AS LAW, supra note 37, at 286-87, 313, 318 n.5.
Clearly, the major purposes of a human rights convention involve the need to respect,
protect, and observe human rights contained therein.
56.
American Convention, supra note 55, art. 32(1).
Id. art. 29(a).
57.
58.
Id. arts. 6(3)(a) ("shall not be placed at the disposal of any private party,
company, or juridical person") and 14(3) ("company"). See also id art. 29(a) ('group, or
person") and art. 29(d) (incorporating the American Declaration-with its express
recognition of private duties-by reference, as does the preamble to the Convention).
59.
See, e.g., Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 232 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); United
States v. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. 44, 46 n.4 (D. Mass. 1997); CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 4,
at 77-78; Report of the Committee, 1994 Report, vol. 1, 49 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 40,
U.N. Doc. A/49/40,

50 ("General comments . . . are intended . . . [among other

purposes] to clarify the requirements of the Covenant ....); see also United States v.
Duarte-Acero, 208 F.3d 1282, 1285 n.12, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 2000); LILLICH & HANNUM,
supra note 51, at 224 ("the gloss").
60.
General Comment No. 20 [concerning violations of Article 7 of the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights] (1992), 13, in International Human Rights Instruments
at 29-32, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1 (1992) (emphasis added).
61.
Id. 2 (emphasis added).
62.
Id. 15 (emphasis added). Concerning the human right of access to courts
and to an effective remedy, see, e.g., CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 4, at 72-73 (Human
Rights Committee General Comment No. 24), 266-68 (including Human Rights
Committee General Comments Nos. 13 and 15), 273, 344, 459, 726; INT'L LAW AS LAW,
supra note 37, at 75 n.97, 198-203, 256-72 nn.468-527, 280 n.556, 292, 362, 375-76; see
also infra note 106 (elaborating upon the "denial of justice").
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In the first U.S. Report to the Human Rights Committee, the
Executive assured the Committee that the U.S. Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA), 68 which reached private perpetrators, was a
measure undertaken in part to comply with the International
Covenant's human rights obligations.64 There has been additional
Executive recognition of the human right of women to freedom from
private violence.6 5 The Executive has also recognized in other
instances that private duties exist under human rights law. 66 In its
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Filartigav.
Pena-Irala, the Executive expressly affirmed that human rights
under international law 'directly create rights and duties of private
67
individuals . . . 'do create such rights and duties.'
In 1860, Justice Campbell, in United States v. Haun,68
emphasized President Jefferson's far earlier recognition of "violations
of human rights" by private "citizens of the United States" in other
countries.6 9 President Jefferson had made such remarks in his Sixth
Annual Message to Congress in 1806 concerning private human

42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1999).
63.
See Summary Record of the 1401st Meeting: United States of America,
64.
29, CCPR/C/SR.140 (1995). Concerning congressional recognition of the human rights
served by the VAWA, see, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Purposes of the Violence
Against Women Act and International Law's Enhancement of CongressionalPower, 22
Hous. J. INT'L L. 209 (2000); Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Federal
News Service, July 21, 1993 (remarks of then Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Senator
Biden); Pam Maples, Bringing Fear Home: U.S. Women Face Pervasive Threat of
Violence, Often at the Hands of Husbands,Boyfriends, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 6,
1993, at 1A (Senator Biden's remarks that VAWA has a human rights purpose and
private domestic violence is "a human rights issue").
65.
See, e.g., Alexander F. Watson, Ass't Sec'y of State for Inter-American Aff.,
Remarks to Inter-American Dialogue and International Center for Research on
Women, Washington, D.C., Oct. 6, 1994, in Summit of the Americas: The Impact on
Women, 5 DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH no. 42 (Oct. 17, 1994) (stressing the human right
of women "to live free from all forms of violence and discrimination in both public and
private spheres"); Bonnie J. Campbell, Director of the Violence Against Women Office
of the U.S. Dep't of Justice, On the Record Briefing, Sept. 12, 1995, addressed in Paust,
Human Rights Purposes,supra note 64, at 213.
See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, On Human Rights: The Use of Human Right
66.
Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic Courts, 10
MICH. J. INT'L L. 543, 617-18, 623-24 n.502 (also quoting President Washington and
McDOWELL, DIGEST, supra note 36, at 171), 630-31 (1989), revised in INT'L LAW AS
LAW, supra note 37, at 199-201, 204-05, 269 n.504; infra text accompanying notes 67,
70.
See supra note 36.
67.
United States v. Haun, 26 F. Cas. 227 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1860) (No. 15,329)
68.
(Campbell, J., on circuit).
69.
Id. at 231. See also Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1026, 1030 (1859)
(No. 18,269a) (Wayne, J.) (assessing whether the "natural rights" of man were violated
by slave trade).
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rights duties to not engage in the slave trade. 70 In The Schooner
Amistad, 71 John Quincy Adams, in argument before the Supreme
Court, had also addressed issues concerning private "violations of
human right" by those involved in the slave trade. 72 The duties
addressed by President Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, and Justice
Campbell are mirrored today in most basic human rights
73
instruments.
To summarize, in addition to express and implied recognition of
private human rights duties in various human rights instruments,
there are recognitions of private human rights duties by the Human
Rights Committee, various UN entities, the European Court of
Human Rights, several courts in other countries, and, among others,
the U.S. Executive, Congress, and the judiciary.

III. TYPES OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEPRIVATIONS

THAT MULTINATIONAL

CORPORATIONS MIGHT CAUSE

Human rights that multinational corporations have been accused
of violating include human rights to life, including the right to enjoy
life; 74 freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment; 75 freedom from forced or slave labor;7 6 freedom from
78
arbitrary detention 77 or deprivation of security of the person;
79
freedom to enjoy property; freedom from deprivation of or injury to

70.
See INT'L LAW As LAW, supra note 37, at 176. Regarding slavery as a
violation of human rights and other private violations of human rights, see also id. at
171, 173-80, 182, 185-86, 200, 215 n.ll (Grotius), 216, 222, 225-28, 232, 276, passim.
40 U.S. 518 (15 Pet.) (1841).
71.
Id.
72.
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note
73.
44, art. 8; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 37, art. 4; American
Convention, supra note 55, art. 6; European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 48, art. 4.
74.
See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d. Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 941 (2001); Herz, supra note 6, at 574-80; A.I. H.R. Report,
supra note 36. For additional cases recognizing the human right to life, see, e.g., INT'L
LAW AS LAW, supra note 37, at 195, 250-51 n.421.
75.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 9-10, 19; Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 92;
Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2001). See also LAW AND
LITIGATION, supra note 4, at 106-07 (describing discrimination against foreigners by
Japanese store).
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 9-10, 14, 16-17; A.I. H.R. Report,
76.
supra note 36; supra note 4.
77.
See, e.g., Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 92; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp.
1078, 1090-95 (S.D. Fla. 1997); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp. 880, 883 (C.D. Cal.
1997).
78.
See, e.g., Bano, 273 F.3d at 120; A.I. H.R. Report, supra note 36.
79.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 13-15; Bodner v. Banque Paribas,
114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Doe, 963 F. Supp. at 884 ("conversion"); supra
note 4.

818

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35:801

health;8 0 enjoyment of a clean and healthy environment 8 1-the latter
also implicating interrelated international law recognizing private
83
82
responsibility for pollution; -and freedom from discrimination.

80.
See, e.g., Bano, 273 F.3d at 120; Herz, supra note 6, at 580-98. See also
Inter-American Comm'n on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of the Inhabitants
of the Interior of Ecuador, supra note 51
[A] number of instruments . . .recognize the critical connection between the
sustenance of human life and the environment .... The realization of the right
to life, and to physical security and integrity is necessarily related to and in
some ways dependent upon one's physical environment. Accordingly, where
environmental contamination and degradation pose a persistent threat to
human life and health, the foregoing rights are implicated. The American
Declaration . . . recognizes the right to life, liberty and personal security in
Article I, and reflects the interrelationship between the rights to life and health
in Article XI, which provides for the preservation of the health and well-being
Severe environmental pollution may pose a threat to
of the individual ....
human life and health .... Respect for the inherent dignity of the person is the
principle which underlies the fundamental protections of the right to life and to
preservation of physical well-being. Conditions of severe environmental
pollution, which may cause serious physical illness, impairment and suffering
on the part of the local populace, are inconsistent with the right to be respected
as a human being. . . . Individuals must have access to judicial recourse to
vindicate the rights to life, physical integrity and to live in a safe
environment....
Id.; Case 7615 (Brazil), INTER-AM. C.H.R., 1984-1985 ANNUAL REPORT 24, O.A.S. Doc.
OEAISer.LfV/II.66, doc. 10, rev. 1 (1985) (the 'Yanomami Indians" case), reprinted in
1985 INTER-AM. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 264; infra notes 87-89.
See, e.g., Bano, 273 F.3d at 120; Herz, supra note 6, at 580-98; supra note
81.
12-13; African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note 47, arts. 21(2), 24;
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11, O.A.S. T.S. No. 69; U.N. Review of
Further Developments in Fields with which the Sub-Commission has been concerned:
Human Rights and Environment, Final Report by the Special Rapporteur, Mrs. Fatma
Zohra Ksentini, U.N. ESC, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9, 9 242,
248, passim (1994); Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v.
Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 114 (Weeramantry, J., sep. op.), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 204, 206
(1998); Grand Bay (Mauritius) Declaration and Plan of Action, supra note 50, 99 2, 8
(n), addressedin Gino J. Naldi, The OAU's GrandBay Declarationon Human Rights in
Africa in Light of the Practice of the African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights, 60 HEIDELBERG J. INT'L L. 715, 717, 719, 724 (2000); cf. Gunther Handl,
Human Rights and Protection of the Environment, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS 303 (A. Eide, C. Krause, A. Rosas eds., 2001).
See Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities
82.
Dangerous to the Environment, June 21, 1993, arts. 6-7, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1228,
1233-34 (1993) (operator of polluting facilities or waste dumps can be liable);
Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan. 30, 1990, art. 4(3)(b), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 773
(1991) (strict liability for hazardous waste); International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, art. III, 973 U.N.T.S. 4, 5; World Charter for
Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, 37 U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, Principles 1 and 24,
U.N. Doc. A/37/51 (1982); African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, supra note
45, arts. 21 (2), 24. Also relevant are the Stockholm Declaration, Declaration of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, pmbl 99 6-7,
Principle 1, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1417-18 (1972), and the Rio Declaration on
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One should also consider private corporate deprivations of rights
contained, for example, in the International Covenant on Economic,
85
84
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), such as free choice in work;
fair wages, a "decent living," and equal remuneration for work of
equal value;8 6 safe and healthy working conditions;8 7 protection of
children from economic exploitation; 88 and protection of mothers. 89
The preamble to the ICESCR, like that of the ICCPR, contains the
express realization that individuals have "duties to other individuals
and to the community" and are "under a responsibility to strive for
the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant." 90 Thus, at a minimum, individuals must not deny or
violate the human rights of others. The treaty also contains express
recognition, like the ICCPR, that it cannot be interpreted to imply for
any "group or person" any right to destroy or limit the rights of others
to a greater extent than is provided. 9 1
When identifying and clarifying actionable human rights, one
need only identify rights that are "sufficiently determinate." 92 More

Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, Principles 13, 27, reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
874, 878, 880 (1992).
83.
See supra notes 23-25 and 33; see also infra note 86.
84.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3.
Id. art. 6. See also INT'L LAW AS LAW, supra note 37, at 195, 249 n.ll
85.
(noting U.S. cases concerning human right to freedom of association in the work
environment); Johnson v. Unisys, Ltd., [2001] UKHL/13 (2001) (discussing freedom
from unfair dismissal, employee "individual dignity and worth," and company's liability
under domestic employment law as also "[slubject to observance of fundamental human
rights"); Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to
Organize and to Bargain Collectively, July 1, 1949, art. 2, 96 U.N.T.S. 258; supra note
76.
86.
See supra note 82, art. 7(a); see also A.I. H.R. Report, supra note 36 ("fair
working conditions"); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235,
1248, 1261 (3d Cir. 1978) (equal opportunity for female employees); supra note 25.
87.
See supra note 82, art. 7(b); see also Lipari v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 493
F.2d 207, 215 (3d Cir. 1974) (human rights are at stake in the case of claims of seamen
in admiralty); Sobosle v. United States Steel Corp., 359 F.2d 7, 9 (3d Cir. 1966); ILO
Convention Concerning Protection of the Right to Organise and Procedures for
Determining Conditions of Employment in the Public Service, June 27, 1978, art. 9,
1218 U.N.T.S. 87.
88.
See supra note 84, art. 10(3).
89.
Id. art. 10(2).
90.
Id. pmbl.
91.
Id. art. 5(1). See also supra note 40.
92.
See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1051-52 (9th
Cir. 2001) (norm need not be specific in human rights instruments); Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)
("definable"); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-82 (2d Cir. 1980) ("sufficiently
determinate" and, importantly, customary human rights are also guaranteed to all
persons under the U.N. Charter and these are "evidenced and defined by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights"); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 187 (D. Mass.
1995); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540-42 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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generally, the judiciary has the primary competence and
responsibility to identify and clarify rights and duties under
customary international law 93 and treaties ratified by the United

States. 94 Additionally, when identifying violations of international
law and rights, duties, competencies, and nonimmunity under
international law, the judiciary must apply international law as it
has evolved. 95 Such judicial competencies and responsibilities are
consistent with the requirements of customary and treaty-based
human rights law that victims have access to courts and an effective
remedy. 96 Because these requirements, as international law, are part
of the laws of the United States, 9 7 they also serve to enhance judicial
power to address human rights violations.
As noted, suits against companies and corporations in the United
States have been brought under the ATCA 98 and various other

93.
See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (noting that it
"must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice"); Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (same); The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 422-23 (9 Cranch) (1815); Kadic
v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467,
1474-75 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); Filartiga,630 F.2d at 88687; Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798-99 (D. Kan. 1980); Senate
Rep. No. 102-249, at 5-6 (1991); INT'L LAW AS LAW, supra note 37, at 6-8, 46-47 nn.5355; RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, §§ 111 (1)-(2), cmts. c-e, 113. These powers are
constitutionally based. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, art. VI, cl. 2; INT'L LAW AS
LAW, supra note 37, at 5-6, 40-43 nn.44-47. Such constitutional bases, coupled with
Article I, § 8, cls. 10, 18 of the Constitution, also enhance congressional power to enact
legislation incorporating international law-such as the ATCA-and such legislation
can involve incorporation of international law by reference-as in the case of the
ATCA-and, thus, a well-recognized congressional deference to the judiciary to perform
traditional judicial tasks of identification and clarification of the content of
international law. See, e.g., Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-30 (1942); United States v.
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 158-62 (1820).
94.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, art. VI, cl. 2; LAW AND LITIGATION, supra
note 4, at 110-33, 171-84, 194, 345-60; INT'L LAW AS LAW, supra note 37, at 51-64, 81101; RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, §§ 111(1)-(2), cmts. c-e, 113.
See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238, 241; Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v.
95.
Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425 (2d Cir. 1987); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 (also
addressing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900) and Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) 198 (1796)); Maria v. McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 233 (E.D.N.Y. 1999);
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 445 (D.N.J. 1999); Jama v. I.N.S., 22 F.
Supp. 2d 353, 362 (D.N.J. 1998); Doe I v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 8
(D.D.C. 1998); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 n.18 (D. Mass. 1995); Forti v.
Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal. 1987); INT'L LAW AS LAW, supra note
37, at 206, 281-82 n.562; H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, at 3-4 (1991), reprinted in 4
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86 (1992) (commenting that "norms... may ripen in the future into rules
of customary international law"). Such a judicial power and responsibility is based in
the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes, since international law is part of the laws of
the United States within the meaning of Articles III, § 2, and VI, cl. 2 of the
Constitution and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See supra notes 93-94.
See supra note 62.
96.
97.
See supra notes 93-95.
98.
See supra notes 5-23.
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statutes. 99 More generally, customary international law has been
directly incorporable without a statutory base since the beginning of
the United States, as fully expected by the Founders. 100 Chief Justice
Marshall recognized in 1810 that our judicial tribunals "are
Federal courts had
established . . .to decide on human rights."''
been using human right precepts prior to Chief Justice Marshall's
affirmation of judicial authority and responsibility and have done so
ever since. 10 2 Additionally, because international law is part of the
laws of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides an alternative
03
basis for both general judicial and subject matter jurisdiction.1
With respect to suits by alien plaintiffs under the ATCA, it
should be noted that it was recognized near the time of formation of

See supra notes 5-6, 14-26.
99.
100.
See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942); The Paquete Habana,
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895); The Nereide, 13
U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422-23 (1815); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 159-60
(1795); Filartiga,630 F.2d at 886-87 & n.20; Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1101-04
(C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360) (Jay, C.J.), 1107-08, 1120 (Wilson, J.); Iwanowa, 67 F.
Supp. 2d at 442 n.20; Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795-800 (D.
Kan. 1980); INT'L LAW AS LAW, supra note 37, at 5, 7-8, 29-30 n.32, 34 n.38, 40-42
nn.44-46, 47-48 nn.54-58, 207; RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 111 (1)-(3), cmts. c, e;
Jordan J. Paust, Customary InternationalLaw and Human Rights Treaties Are Law of
the United States, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 301, 301-05 (1999). Such overwhelming trends
in judicial decision are not surprising, since constitutional bases for judicial
incorporation exist. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. arts. III, § 2, VI, cl. 2; INT'L LAW AS LAW,
supranote 37, at 5-6, 40-43 nn.44-47.
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810).
101.
102.
See, e.g., INT'L LAW AS LAW, supra note 37, at 182-98, 228-56; see also
Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 602-03 (1980).
It has long been established that in certain situations, individuals may sue to
enforce their rights under international law....

The ... international law of

human rights . . .endows individuals with the right to invoke international
law, in a competent forum .... As a result, in nations like the United States
where international law is part of the law of the land, an individual's
fundamental human rights are in certain situations directly enforceable in
domestic courts .. .
Id.
103.
See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, No. 90-2010 (N.D. Ga. 1993), aff'd, 72 F.3d
844 (11th Cir. 1996); Martinez-Baca v. Suarez-Mason, No. 87-2057, slip op. at 4-5 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 22, 1988); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1538, 1544 (N.D. Cal.
1987); INT'L LAW AS LAW, supra note 37, at 7, 43 n.48; RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, §
111, cmt. e and RN 4; Paust, Customary InternationalLaw, supra note 100, at 304-05
& n.24; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that causes
of action under ATCA and TVPA "are statutorily authorized, and, as in Filartiga[630
F.2d at 887 n.22], we need not rule definitely on whether any causes of action not
specifically authorized by statute may be implied by international law standards as
incorporated into United States law and grounded on section 1331 jurisdiction."); Doe I
v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 9 (D.D.C. 1998) (not deciding, but noting
that Kadic recognized such a possibility). But see Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp.
162, 194 (D. Mass. 1995).
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the ATCA that the legislation provides both a right of action, or
"remedy by a civil suit," and a forum. 10 4 Access to courts by aliens
and rights to a remedy for violations of international law were of
great importance in order to not "deny justice" to aliens, which would
constitute a violation of international law by the United States and
exacerbate relations with foreign states.10 5 An original purpose of the
ATCA was to avoid a "denial of justice" to aliens in violation of
customary international law by providing them access to U.S. courts
with respect to injuries received in the United States or abroad at the
10 6
hands of U.S. nationals or others found within the United States.
Today, it is also well-recognized that the ATCA provides a cause
of action, or right to a remedy, and that the only relevant inquiry is
whether suit is brought by an alien, for a tort only, alleging a
violation of international law. 10 7 Even if the ATCA did not provide a
right to a remedy, human rights treaties incorporated through the
ATCA provide rights enforceable by private parties, and human
rights law requires access to domestic courts and enforcement of the

104.
See 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795).
105.
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring).
106.
Id., quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (and
adding "Under the law of nations, states are obliged to make civil courts of justice
accessible for claims of foreign subjects against individuals within the state's
territory."). See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 711, cmts. a, c, e, RN 2 (denial of
access to courts, judicial denial of human rights, and denial of remedies for injury
inflicted by state actors or private persons); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795); INT'L LAW
AS LAW, supra note 37, at 199, 258-61 nn.479, 481; 385 n.87; Anthony D'Amato, The
Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 62, 64-65
(1988); Stephens, Federalism,supra note 6, at 522.
107.
See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847-48 (11th Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 830 (1996); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S.
1005 (1996); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1474-75 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1126 (1995); Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830
F.2d 421, 424-25 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 488 U.S. 428 (1989); Tel-Oren
v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d at 777, 779-80 (Edwards, J., concurring); Filartiga,
630 F.2d at 880-82, 884-85, 887; Estate of Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 157 F. Supp. 2d
1345, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 441-43
(D.N.J. 1999); Jama v. I.N.S., 22 F. Supp. 2d 353, 362-63 (D.N.J. 1998); Xuncax, 886 F.
Supp. at 179; Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Forti v. SuarezMason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539-40 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp.
276, 279-80 (S.D. Cal. 1986); Jaffe v. Boyles, 616 F. Supp. 1371, 1379 (W.D.N.Y. 1985)
(court can fashion remedies); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250, 252-53 (1907); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57,
58 (1795); INT'L LAW AS LAW, supra note 37, at 203, 206-08, 212, 281 nn.560-61, 282
nn.570-71. See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(international law provides "substantive principles" and "tort" means wrong under or
in violation of international law). But see Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798 (Bork, J.,
concurring). Judge Bork's views were in error, were opposed by Judge Edwards in TelOren, and have not been followed. See, e.g., Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 442 n.20
(Bork's "highly criticized opinion," "reasoning is flawed"); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238; Forti,
672 F. Supp. at 1539.
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right to an effective remedy.10 8
It should also be noted that the ATCA is congressional
legislation that executes, implements, or incorporates by reference,
treaties of the United States. 10 9 The ATCA performs the very role
that implementing legislation plays with respect to non-self-executing
treaties, and it also provides a cause of action and a remedy." 0 Thus,
treaties that are not self-executing for the purpose of creating a
private cause of action are executed or implemented by the ATCA."'

108.
See, e.g., INT'L LAW AS LAW, supra note 37 at 75 n.97, 198-203, 256-72
nn.468-527, 280 n.556, 292, 362, 375-76, passim; LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 4, at
72-73 (Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 24), 266-68, 273, 344, 459,
726; Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 82 (Tex. 2000) ("The Covenant
[ICCPR] not only guarantees foreign citizens equal treatment in the signatorie's courts,
but also guarantees them equal access to these courts.").
109.
See, e.g., LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 4, at 194; INT'L LAW AS LAW,
supra note 37, at 207, 282 n.571, 371-72; Paust, Customary InternationalLaw, supra
note 100, at 327 & n.126; Jordan J. Paust, Suing Karadzic, 10 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 91, 92
(1997); infra note 111.
110.
See supra notes 107-08.
111.
Estate of Cabello, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1359-60; Ralk v. Lincoln County, 81 F.
Supp. 2d 1372, 1380-81 (S.D. Ga. 2000) ("because the ICCPR is not self-executing, Ralk
can advance no private right of action under the ICCPR," but "could bring a claim
under the Alien Tort Claims Act for violations of the ICCPR"). But see Iwanowa, 67 F.
Supp. 2d at 439 n.16 (missing this point when suggesting in false dictum that two law
of war treaties (1) do not "confer rights enforceable by private parties." But see Kadic,
70 F.3d at 242-43; supra note 4; Jordan J. Paust, Suing Saddam: PrivateRemedies for
War Crimes and Hostage-Taking, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 351, 360-69 (1991) and (2) are
entirely non-self-executing-and then falsely concluding, in terse, unreasoned, and
unsupported dictum beyond what plaintiff had argued or briefed, see id. at 439, that
"[s]ince neither ... provide a private action, they cannot provide a basis for suit under
the ATCA." Even under Iwanowa's false dictum, human rights treaties are clearly
distinguishable because they provide a private action.). Additionally, the treaty
addressed in 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250 (1907) did not mention any "right of action" or
"private action," individuals, or private rights, but the Attorney General correctly found
that a violation of the treaty by the U.S. company was actionable in view of the fact
that the ATCA provides a right of action. See Convention between the United States of
America and the United States of Mexico touching the international boundary line
where it follows the bed of the Rio Grande and the Rio Colorado, Nov. 12, 1884, 24 Stat.
1011. Article III of the treaty stated in pertinent part: "No artificial change in the
navigable course of the river . . .or by dredging to deepen .. .shall be permitted to

affect or alter the dividing line .. " Id. art. III. This was also the approach regarding
treaty violations at the time of formation of the ATCA. See, e.g., Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F.
Cas. 810, 811 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (Article 14 of the U.S.-France Treaty of Amity
and Commerce, 17 July 1778, 8 Stat. 12, T.S. 83, required forfeiture of the property
interest of Darrers principal, treaty did not mention any "right of action" or "private
action," but claimant Bolchos had an actionable claim under the ATCA to restitution of
"property" (slaves) wrongfully seized by Darrel); M'Grath v. Candalero, 16 F. Cas. 128
(D.C.D. S.C. 1794) (No. 6810) (1778 U.S.-French Treaty of Amity and Commerce, supra
re: treaty, see id., 16 F. Cas. at 127, did not mention any "right of action" or "private
action," but was used as the U.S. plaintiffs "tort" remedy; ATCA addressed by analogy
and per dictum; cf arts. 17, 22 of the treaty, recognizing that some individuals shall be
"bound to make Satisfaction for all Matter of Damage, and the Interest thereof, by
reparation, under the Pain and obligation of their Person and Goods," "full Satisfaction
shall be made"); 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795) (apparently the U.S.-British Treaty of

824

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35:801

More generally, the ATCA expressly incorporates all treaties of the
United States by reference, and it is the ATCA that provides the
direct basis for a lawsuit or private action, not the treaties as such.
Further, it is not the prerogative of courts to rewrite a long-standing
statute to apply merely to some treaties but not to others.
With respect to suits against companies for violations of
customary international law and the reach of the ATCA, two errors in
Doe v. Unocal Corp. are worth attention.
First, dictum that
customary international law rests upon "consent" of "states" and that
"states that refuse to agree ... are not bound" is in serious error. 112
Second, the statement that only jus cogens violations are actionable
under the ATCA is also in serious error.1 1 3 The ATCA contains no
list or limitations of applicable customary international law or
treaties of the United States and expressly applies to "any" civil
action for a tort in violation of such international law. To add limits

Peace, 3 Sept. 1783, 8 Stat. 80, T.S. 104, was the ("a") treaty violated, and the ATCA
provides a right of action. The Treaty of Peace did not mention a relevant "right of
action"; cf Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, 19 Nov. 1794, arts. 19, 21, 8
Stat. 116, not mentioning any "right of action" or "private action," but re: injuries by
Men of War or Privateers, individuals "shall be bound in their persons and Estates to
make satisfaction and reparation for all Damages, and the interest thereof, of whatever
nature the said Damages may be." Injuries addressed in the Opinion occurred
September 28, 1794, before ratification of the Treaty of Amity. The Opinion also
emphasizes a warning to U.S. citizens by the President issued April 22, 1793-when
only the Treaty of Peace was operative).
112.
Compare Doe v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1304 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
and Beanal v. Freeport McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 370 (E.D. La. 1997) (dictum)
with The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694, 700-01, 707-08 (1900); The Scotia, 81
U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187-88 (1871) ("generally accepted"); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat) 66, 115, 119, 121 (1825); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 227 (1796);
Filartiga,630 F.2d at 881 ('general" assent); Estate of Cabello, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 1359
("by a 'generality' of states"); Xuncax, 886 F. Supp. at 187 ("It is not necessary that
every aspect of what might comprise a standard [under customary international law]
be fully defined and universally agreed upon before a given action . . . is clearly
proscribed under international law .. "); Forti v. Suarez-Masoh, 694 F. Supp. 707, 709
(N.D. Cal. 1988) ("To meet this burden, plaintiffs need not establish unanimity among
nations. Rather, they must show a general recognition among states that a specific
practice is prohibited."); LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 4, at 25, 28-29, 35-36, 83-84,
92-94, 96-98, 131; INT'L LAW AS LAW, supra note 37, at 1-3, 10-11 nn.2-4, 15-18 n.14,
and cases cited.
113.
Compare Doe, 110 F. Supp. 2d at 1304 with Alvarez-Machain v. United
States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) ("This court has ... never held that a jus
cogens violation is required"); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 941 (2001) (imprisonment, among other violations);
Weisshaus v. Swiss Bankers Ass'n, 225 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2000) (concerning war crimes,
among other violations); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242-43 (2d Cir. 1995) (war
crimes); Nguyen da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201-02 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975); Doe I
v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 5, 7-8 (D.D.C. 1998) (claims regarding war
crimes, hijacking, mutilation, among others); Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 864 (D.
Md. 1961); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795); 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250 (1907);
1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795). See also M'Grath, 16 F. Cas. at 128 (dictum addressing any
violation).
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that Coxigress has not chosen would be to rewrite the clear language
of a long-standing federal statute and to violate the separation of
powers. Further, at the time of formation of the ATCA, the notion of
a complete enumeration or short list of human rights would have
been anathema to the Founders. 114 The same would have been true
more generally with respect to the law of nations. 115 Still today, the
general statute incorporating the laws of war by reference as offenses
against the law of the United States does not attempt to list such
crimes or to provide limits concerning the numerous war crimes
116
proscribed by international law.

IV. CONCLUSION
From the above, a corporation can recognizably become involved
in violations of human rights law either directly as a private actor; as
an actor colored by a connection with a state, state entity, or other
public actor; or as a participant in a joint venture or complicitous
relation with another human rights violator. Decisions and activities
of multinational corporations can significantly impact human rights,
and one can predict that there will be increasing scrutiny of corporate
deprivations of human rights at the international and regional levels
and in domestic fora.
Although not discussed, multinational corporations also have
significant opportunities to promote greater realization of many types
Greater attention by corporate lawyers and
of human rights.
relevant international economic institutions to what types of human
rights might be at stake in certain circumstances and to possible
strategies to enhance human rights and to avoid deprivations and
concomitant liability will more greatly assure responsible
participation in efforts to ensure respect for and observance of human
117
rights for all persons.

114.
See, e.g., INT'L LAW AS LAW, supra note 37, at 174-75, 221 n.90, 330-32, 34950 nn.45, 50.
115.
Id. at 8, 48-50 nn.60-88; Resolution of the Continental Congress (1781), 21
J. CONT'L CONG. 1136-37, reprinted in LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 4, at 23-24.
116.
See 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 821; LAW AND LITIGATION, supra note 4, at 147;
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 4, at 243, .254-55.
117.
Concerning state responsibility to engage in such efforts, see, e.g., U.N.
CHARTER, pmbl., arts. 1(3), 55(c), 56.

